Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.9.2

Luna USB HSM 7 firmware version 7.9.2 was released in February 2026.

>Download Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.9.2

CAUTION!   Read the Advisory Notes before installing this update, to be aware of important changes that may require your attention.

New Features and Enhancements

This release synchronizes the functionality of the Luna USB HSM 7 with the latest Luna Network HSM 7 and Luna PCIe HSM 7 releases. Luna USB HSM 7 firmware 7.9.2 includes the following new features and enhancements:

ML-KEM and ML-DSA Mechanisms for Post Quantum Cryptography

This release includes support for post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) and ML-DSA (Module-Lattice based Digital Signature Algorithm). Refer to:

>New PKCS extension descriptions:

ML-KEM Programming Guide

ML-DSA Programming Guide for Luna HSM

>New cryptographic mechanisms:

CKM_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_ML_KEM

CKM_ML_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_ML_DSA

CKM_EXTMU_ML_DSA

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA3_224

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA3_256

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA3_384

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA3_512

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA224

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA256

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA384

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHA512

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHAKE128

CKM_HASH_ML_DSA_SHAKE256

ML-KEM and ML-DSA Private Key Wrapping and Unwrapping

Private keys created with ML-KEM and ML-DSA mechanisms can be wrapped and unwrapped. Refer to:

>New example procedure: Private Key Wrapping of ML-KEM and ML-DSA

ML-KEM Cloning Ciphers

The following post-quantum cipher suites are now included for cloning between application partitions:

>ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512

>ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512

>ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512

>ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512

Refer to Enabling and Disabling CPv4 Cipher Suites for instructions on customizing cipher suites.

Attestation of PQC Keys

To check the attestation of PQC and ECC keys, use the Thales ECC Manufacturing Integrity Certificate.

Access Partition Utilization Metrics without HSM SO Login

You can now choose whether Partition Utilization Metrics can be viewed/exported and reset without needing login to the HSM. For continuity, the option defaults to requiring SO login, but that can be changed with a single command, to suit your security and auditing regimes. The existing QoS commands function as previously; only access to them is affected. This option is set using HSM Policy 58: Allow Unrestricted Metrics Access.

New Wrapping Mechanism in SCP03

CKM_AES_CBC_CMAC_WRAP is added to Secure Channel Protocol 03 (SCP03). Refer to:

>New cryptographic mechanism: CKM_AES_CBC_CMAC_WRAP

Curve secp256k1 performance

Curve secp256k1 (curve 10 in the multitoken utility) handling has been optimized, improving performance of all ECDH and ECIES and BIP32 mechanisms where it is used.

NOTE   This enhancement is not available when the Luna USB HSM 7 is in FIPS-approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0).

SLIP10 for BIP32

SLIP10 derivation is added for BIP32 key type, with curve options secp256k1, NIST P-256, and ED25519. See SLIP 10.

ECIES HKDF Support

Support for HKDF (HMAC Key Derive Function) is added to ECIES. Adds HKDF Extract and Expand functions to support all Hash methods. Includes tools CKDemo, Multitoken, and fmultitoken. See ECIES Enhancement for HKDF.

Support for ED448 and Curve448

Crypto agility expands with the addition of support for ed448 and curve448.

Key Translation Function for 5G

Key Translation function- allows to securely import subscriber authentication keys into a 5G authentication platform (UDM).

The mechanism is used with the C_WrapKey command to receive a cryptogram from the client and re-encrypt it using a different key and/or mechanism; the result is then returned to the client.

See Luna Key Translation.

Choose Whether a Password Change Logs Out All Sessions

An option to the role changepw and role resetpw commands allows you to choose whether

>the change/reset operation immediately logs out all sessions open with that authentication (such as if an authentication has been compromised, where it is important to halt activity under a suspect role for security reasons) or

>open sessions are allowed to continue under the old authentication until closed (such as during routine password rollover, where it is important to allow operations to complete undisturbed).

HMAC Accepts Zero-byte Input

All cryptographic mechanisms with "HMAC" in the name now accept zero-byte input.

Session Memory Management Optimization

Applications are responsible for closing crypto sessions and releasing resources when they are no longer being used. Failure to do might eventually consume all available HSM memory. This memory management optimization allows you to support a higher number of simultaneous sessions by reducing the memory allocated per session, and to gracefully fail in case the available memory goes below a minimal threshold. It allows you to perform the appropriate administration tasks, maintain the availability of your platform, and prevent a crash.

See Cryptographic Module and Token Return Codes; refer to the note for errors 0x00310000 through 0x00310007.

Universal Cloning

Cloning (or migration) of keys and objects between Thales HSMs, has been enhanced as follows.

Updated encryption

Cloning encryption is now ECC-based (formerly RSA) and separates session-key negotiation from the use of session keys for migrating/transfering keys and objects within the security perimeter of the cryptographic module with the following advantages:

>Consolidate HSM resources with secure and transparent exchanges of cryptographic material among mixed authentication modes:

multifactor quorum-authenticated and

password-authenticated partitions.

>Transfer keys to an entirely new domain, providing full interoperability between on-premises Luna USB HSM 7 partitions and Luna Cloud HSM services.

Enhanced cipher suite options

Multiple cipher suites are available for cloning.

>Ciphers can be individually enabled or disabled by command.

>The protocol negotiates the strongest common suite enabled on source and target.

Multiple domains

Extended Domain Management widens the scope of key-migration/key-cloning operations, while maintaining the cryptographic module's security perimeter.

>Up to three domains can be associated with a partition.

>Domains can be labeled for ease of management, and the labels can be changed for convenience.

>Password-authenticated cloning domains (text string) and multifactor quorum-authenticated domains (iKey secret) can be mixed on a single partition.

>Keys and objects can be shifted from one domain (that you control) to another (that you control).

Session Key Lifetime Management

>Negotiated sessions have a finite lifetime (minimizing possibility of abuse), while being renegotiated with no burden to your applications.

>Multiple keys/objects can be transferred at one time, from one partition to another without requiring key-negotiation for each transfer (compare with prior behavior).

See Universal Cloning.

Advisory Notes

This section highlights important issues you should be aware of before installing Luna USB HSM 7 firmware version 7.9.2.

Migrate Keys From FIPS-Configured Luna USB HSM G5 Before Updating to This Version

Using Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.3 or newer in FIPS approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0), cloning from Luna USB HSM G5 with firmware 6.24.7 is disallowed. Therefore, you must migrate your keys to Luna USB HSM 7 with Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.2 installed, before you update the firmware.

Requires Luna HSM Client 10.9.2 or Newer

This version of the Luna USB HSM 7 firmware requires Luna HSM Client 10.9.2 or newer.

FIPS Changes in Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.9.2 and Newer

This release synchronizes functionality with the latest release of the Luna HSM firmware. New restrictions have been added to some mechanisms when the HSM or partition is in FIPS approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0), to comply with FIPS 186-5 Digital Signature Standard (NIST SP 800-186).

RSA Key Pair Generation Mechanisms for FIPS 186-3 Allow 6144- and 8192-Bit Keys

Using the following mechanisms, you can now generate 6144-bit and 8192-bit RSA keypairs in FIPS approved configuration:

>CKM_RSA_FIPS_186_3_AUX_PRIME_KEY_PAIR_GEN

>CKM_RSA_FIPS_186_3_PRIME_KEY_PAIR_GEN

New Partition Policy Allows Signature Verification with ECDSA and RSA

A new partition policy 45: Allow ECDSA/RSA Prehash SigVer enables a prehash operation that allows mechanisms that do not have a hash function to perform verification. With this policy enabled, the following mechanisms are now permitted to perform verification in FIPS approved configuration:

>CKM_DSA

>CKM_ECDSA

>CKM_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS

>CKM_RSA_X9_31

Mechanisms that are now available in FIPS 140 approved configuration

The following mechanisms are now available for use in FIPS 140 approved configuration (formerly FIPS mode):

>CKM_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA224_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA256_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA384_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA512_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA3_224_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA3_256_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA3_384_EDDSA

>CKM_SHA3_512_EDDSA

Mechanisms no longer available in FIPS 140 approved configuration

The following mechanism is now restricted from use in FIPS 140 approved configuration (formerly FIPS mode):

>CKM_AES_MAC

>CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL

>CKM_DES3_MAC

>CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL

>CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN

>CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN

>CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN

Mechanisms not permitted to sign objects in FIPS 140 approved configuration

The following mechanisms are not permitted to sign objects in FIPS 140 approved configuration:

>CKM_DSA

>CKM_DSA_SHA224

>CKM_DSA_SHA256

>CKM_RSA_X9_31

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_224

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_256

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_384

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_512

>CKM_SHA224_RSA_X9_31

>CKM_SHA256_RSA_X9_31

>CKM_SHA384_RSA_X9_31

>CKM_SHA512_RSA_X9_31

Mechanisms now check for approved EC curves in FIPS 140 approved configuration

The following mechanisms now verify that the specified EC curve is FIPS-approved, and reject operations that specify non-approved curves:

>CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE

>CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE

>CKM_ECDSA

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA1

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA224

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA256

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA384

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA512

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_224

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_256

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_384

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_512

>CKM_ECIES

>CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN

>CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN_W_EXTRA_BITS

Allowed Elliptic Curves

Curve Name Mechanisms Curve Field Type Security Strength Permitted Operations
Sign Verify Derive
B-233

ECDSA, EC key
establishment

Thales terminology

Binary Field – GF(2m) 112-bits X X X
B-283 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 128-bits X X X
B-409 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 192-bits X X X
B-571 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 256-bits X X X
K-233 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 112-bits X X X
K-283 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 128-bits X X X
K-409 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 192-bits X X X
K-571 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Binary Field – GF(2m) 256-bits X X X
P-244 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 112-bits X X X
P-256 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 128-bits X X X
P-384 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 192-bits X X X
P-521 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 256-bits X X X
Edwards448 EdDSA

Prime field – GF(p) 224-bits X X X
Edwards25519 EdDSA

Prime field – GF(p) 128-bits X X X
Brainpool P512r1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 256-bits X X X
Brainpool P512t1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 256-bits X X X
Brainpool P-384r1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 192-bits X X X
Brainpool P-384t1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 192-bits X X X
Brainpool P320r1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 160-bits X X X
Brainpool P320t1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 160-bits X X X
secp256k1 Blockchain Prime field – GF(p) 128-bits X X no*
Brainpool P-256r1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 128-bits X X X
Brainpool P-256t1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 128-bits X X X
Brainpool P-224r1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 112-bits X X X
Brainpool P-224t1 ECDSA, EC key
establishment
Prime field – GF(p) 112-bits X X X

The above table applies to Luna PCIe HSM 7, Luna Network HSM 7, and Luna USB HSM 7 firmware 7.8.9 and newer, and 7.7.3 and newer, respectively.

*The secp256k1 (BIP32) curve cannot be used for ECDH or ECIES derivation in FIPS 140 approved configuration.

Partition Policy 9: Allow DigestKey is Destructive When Turned On

Partition policy 9: Allow DigestKey is set to 0 by default when you update to Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.9.2 or newer, and it is destructive when changed from 0 to 1. If you were using C_DigestKey with Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.2, and you need to continue using it, you must back up the contents of your application partition and restore them after changing the policy. Refer to Partition Backup and Restore.

FIPS Changes in Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.3 and Newer

New restrictions have been added to some mechanisms when the HSM or partition is in FIPS approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0), to comply with NIST SP800-131a Rev2 and SP800-56B Rev2, published in March 2019.

Mechanisms no longer available in FIPS approved configuration

The following mechanisms are no longer available in FIPS approved configuration:

>CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

>CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

>CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN

>CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN

NOTE   If you need to generate FIPS-compliant domain parameters for this mechanism, use CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN with modulus length 2048 or 3072.

DES/DES3 encryption not permitted using ECIES mechanisms

The following mechanisms are not permitted to encrypt in FIPS approved configuration (decrypt operations are permitted):

>CKM_DES_CFB8

>CKM_DES_CFB64

>CKM_DES_OFB64

>CKM_DES3_CBC

>CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD

>CKM_DES3_CTR

>CKM_DES3_ECB

HMAC mechanisms not permitted to sign using DES3 keys

The following mechanisms are not permitted to sign objects with a DES3 key in FIPS approved configuration (verify operations are permitted):

>CKM_SHA224_HMAC

>CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA256_HMAC

>CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA384_HMAC

>CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA512_HMAC

>CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC

>CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC

>CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC

>CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC_GENERAL

>CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC

>CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC_GENERAL

Mechanisms now check for approved EC curves in FIPS mode

The following mechanisms now verify that the specified EC curve is FIPS-approved, and reject operations that specify non-approved curves:

>CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE

>CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE

>CKM_ECDSA

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA1

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA224

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA256

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA384

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA512

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_224

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_256

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_384

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_512

>CKM_ECIES

>CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN

>CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN_W_EXTRA_BITS

CKM_RSA_PKCS not permitted to decrypt/unwrap objects

To comply with FIPS 140-3 requirements, RSA-based key transport schemes that use only PKCS#1-v1.5 padding are disallowed. Therefore, CKM_RSA_PKCS is now restricted from performing decrypt/unwrap operations.

NOTE   When the HSM or partition is in FIPS approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0), CKM_RSA_PKCS is disabled even if partition policy 33: Allow RSA PKCS mechanism is set to 1.

3DES usage counter has been removed

The 3DES usage counter attribute (CKA_BYTES_REMAINING) has been removed in Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.3 and newer, to comply with FIPS 140-3 requirements. This attribute is now ignored on any keys where it is already set.

FIPS Changes in Luna USB HSM 7 Firmware 7.7.2 and Newer

New restrictions have been added to some mechanisms when the HSM or partition is in FIPS approved configuration (HSM policy 12: Allow non-FIPS algorithms or partition policy 43: Allow non-FIPS algorithms set to 0), to comply with FIPS SP800-131a Rev2, published in March 2019. Consider these functional changes when migrating from Luna USB HSM G5.

Mechanisms not permitted to wrap objects in FIPS mode

The following mechanisms are not permitted to wrap objects in FIPS mode (unwrap operations are permitted):

>CKM_AES_CBC

>CKM_AES_CBC_PAD

>CKM_AES_CTR

>CKM_AES_ECB

>CKM_DES3_CBC

>CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD

>CKM_DES3_CTR

>CKM_DES3_ECB

>CKM_RSA_PKCS

Mechanisms not permitted to sign data in FIPS mode

The following mechanisms are not permitted to sign data in FIPS mode (verify operations are permitted):

>CKM_AES_MAC

>CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL

>CKM_DES3_MAC

>CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL

>CKM_DSA_SHA1

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA1

>CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS

>CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31

Mechanisms approved for use in FIPS mode

The following mechanisms are now approved for use in FIPS mode:

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_224

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_256

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_384

>CKM_DSA_SHA3_512

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_224

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_256

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_384

>CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_512

>CKM_SHA3_224

>CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS_PSS

>CKM_SHA3_256

>CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS_PSS

>CKM_SHA3_384

>CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS_PSS

>CKM_SHA3_512

>CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS

>CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS_PSS