Domain Planning
The cloning or security domain is an element of Layered Encryption.
What is a security domain or cloning domain?
A security domain or cloning domain is a layer of encryption that is created, during initialization, on an HSM or HSM partition that you control. The domain determines whether a crypto object can leave the HSM, and where it can go if it is allowed to leave.
Cloning is a secure-copy operation by which sensitive HSM objects are copied, while strongly encrypted, from one HSM to another HSM. The security domain, or cloning domain, is a special-purpose secret that is attached to a partition on an HSM. It determines to which, and from which, other partitions (on the same HSM or on other HSMs) the current partition can clone objects. Partitions that send or receive partition objects by means of the cloning protocol must share identical cloning domain secrets. That is, the protocol verifies that the destination domain matches the source domain; otherwise an error is displayed and the attempted operation fails. This is important for:
> Cloning in backup and restore operations, and
>Synchronization in HA groups.
Only one domain per partition - no copying across domains
An application partition can have one cloning domain. It is not possible to clone objects from two or more different cloning domains to a single partition. By design, there is no provision to change the cloning domain of a partition without initializing it, which destroys any objects in that partition.
No common domains across Password-authenticated and PED-authenticated HSMs
Password authenticated application partitions, with identical security domains, can clone partition contents one to the other, if the HSM type supports cloning.
Multi-factor authenticated (PED authenticated) application partitions, with identical security domains, can clone partition contents one to the other, if the HSM type supports cloning.
But password authenticated HSM partitions cannot perform cloning with PED-authenticated HSM partitions.
The security design consideration is that, if you have a key or object stored in a multi-factor-authenticated (PED-authenticated) partition:
>It cannot be altered to a less-secure state and moved outside the protection of its original security/cloning domain.
>You are assured that the key or object has never been outside its original security/cloning domain, or in any less-secure state.
As of firmware 7.7.0, and any V1 (non-backward-compatible) partitions, backup and HA replication of crypto objects are accomplished with SKS encrypted blobs, and the cloning protocol is reserved for the SMK - the key that encrypts the SKS blobs.
Characteristics of Cloning Domains
Password authenticated HSMs have text-string cloning domains for the HSM admin partition and for any partitions that are created on the HSM. HSM and Partition domains are typed at the command line of the host computer, when required. Password authentication cloning domains are created by you.
PED authenticated cloning domains are created by a Luna HSM, which could be the current HSM, or it could be a previously initialized HSM that you wish to include in a cloning group with the current HSM. PED authenticated HSMs have cloning domains in the form of encrypted secrets on red PED keys, for the admin partition and for any partitions that are created on the HSM.
The following characteristics are common to security (cloning) domains on all Luna HSMs.
>The unique admin partition security domain can be created in the HSM at initialization time, or it can be imported, meaning that it is shared with one-or-more other HSMs.
>The application partition security domain can be created by the current HSM when the partition is initialized, or it can be imported, meaning that it is shared with one-or-more other HSM partitions, and therefore direct cloning, backup/restore, and HA sync operations can be performed among the partitions that share a given domain.
>The application partition security domain is usually distinct from the HSM domain, as they are controlled by different people; on multi-partition HSMs, the PSO is usually not the same person as the HSM SO, but on a single-partition HSM the two SOs might be the same person.
>The application partition security domain can be the same as the domain of another partition on the same HSM (for HSMs that support multiple partitions).
For PED authenticated HSMs, the domain secret for the admin partition or for an application partition can be a single red PED key, or it can be split (by the MofN quorum feature) over several red keys, which are then distributed among trusted personnel such that no single person is able to provide the cloning domain without oversight from other trusted personnel.
In scenarios where multiple HSM partitions are in use, it can be useful to segregate those partitions according to department or business unit, or according to function groups within your organization. This ensures that personnel in a given group are able to clone or backup/restore only the contents of partitions sharing the domain for which they are responsible.
For Password authenticated HSMs, that sort of segregation is maintained entirely by procedure and by trust, as you rely on personnel not to share the domain text strings, just as you rely on them not to share other passwords.
Have your naming conventions and allotments planned out ahead of HSM initialization and partition creation, including a well-thought-out map of who should control cloning domain access for admin partitions and for application partitions. These decisions must be made before you create the partitions.
