Comparison of Destruction/Denial Actions

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Comparison of Destruction/Denial Actions

Various operations on the SafeNet HSM are intended to make HSM contents unavailable to potential intruders. The effect of those actions are summarized and contrasted in the following table, along with notes on how to recognize and how to recover from each scenario.

Event	MTK is destroyed HSM is unavailable, but use/access can be recovered after reboot (See Note 1)	KEK is destroyed (Real-Time Clock and NVRAM) HSM contents cannot be recovered without restore from backup (See Note 2)	Reset appliance admin password	How to discover (See Note 3)	How to recover
- three bad SO login attempts or - lunash:> hsm zeroize (for SafeNet Network HSM), lunacm:> hsm zeroize (for SafeNet PCIe HSM and SafeNet USB HSM) or - lunash:> hsm factoryReset (for SafeNet Network HSM), lunacm:> hsm factoryreset (for SafeNet PCIe HSM and SafeNet USB HSM) or - any change to a destructive policy or - firmware rollback (See Note 4)	NO	YES	NO	hsm.log entry or "Zeroized: Yes" in HSM Information (from hsm show command)	Restore HSM objects from Backup
login to SafeNet Network HSM "recover" account (local serial connection)	NO	NO	YES	Syslog entry shows login by "recover"	Log into appliance as admin, using the reset password "PASSWORD" and change to a secure password
hardware tamper - undervoltage or overvoltage during operation or - under-temperature or over-temperature during operation or - chassis interference (such as cover, fans, etc.) OR software (command-initiated) tamper - lunash:> hsm srk transportMode enter or - lunacm:> srk transport	YES	NO	NO	Best practice - have external MTK split on SRK (purple PED Key), which forces administrative intervention to recover from tamper. Otherwise, parse hsm.log for text like "tamper", "TVK was corrupted", or "Generating new TVK", indicating that a tamper event was logged. Example: `RTC: external tamper latched/MTK: security function was zeroized on previous tamper event and has not been restored yet` ... also, keywords in hsm.log like: "HSM internal error", "device error" SafeNet Network HSM appliance front panel flashes error 30.	Reboot [See Note 1]
decommission (shorting-circuiting the tamper2 header pins on SafeNet PCIe HSM, or pressing the Decommission button on the back of the SafeNet Network HSM appliance, which shorts tamper2, or unplugging main power and removing the battery from SafeNet USB HSM)	NO	YES	NO	Look for log entry like: RTC: tamper 2 signal/Zeroizing HSM after decommission...LOG(INFO): POWER-UP LOG DUMP END	Restore HSM objects from Backup
Note 1a: MTK is an independent layer of encryption on HSM contents, to manage tamper and Secure Transport Mode. A destroyed MTK is recovered on next reboot if no external split (SRK) of the recovery vector exists (that is, if both portions of the recovery key are available inside the HSM). A destroyed MTK can be recovered if one of the recovery components has been moved outside the HSM onto a secure recovery key (SRK), and that SRK can be presented via SafeNet PED at the next HSM reboot. If MTK cannot be recovered, only restoring from backup onto a new or re-manufactured HSM can retrieve your keys and HSM data. Note 1b: If an external SRV exists, and you wish to stop using it (having no need for Secure Transport Mode, and no need for enforced administrative response in case of a tamper event), you must bring the external SRV back into the HSM with srk disable command. You may not simply destroy or overwrite the purple PED Key without first ensuring that the HSM is in possession of all the MTK recovery components. Note 2: KEK is an HSM-wide encryption layer that encrypts all HSM objects, excluding only MTK, RPK, a wrapping key, and a couple of keys used for legacy support. A destroyed KEK cannot be recovered. If the KEK is destroyed, only restoring from backup can retrieve your keys and HSM data. Note 3: To check the health of a remote HSM, script a frequent login to the HSM host and execution of a subset of HSM commands. If a command fails, check the logs for an indication of the cause. Note 4: These actions all create a situation where hsm init is required, or strongly recommended before the HSM is used again.

In addition, another event/action that has a destructive component is HSM initialization, which can be of either the "soft" or "hard" variety.

•HSM init is soft if you have not performed an hsm factoryReset before hsm init.

•HSM init is hard if it is performed following hsm factoryReset.

Either way, HSM and partition objects are gone, so only a restore from backup can bring them back. Effects of soft versus hard initializations are summarized below :

Condition/Effect	Soft init	Hard init
SO authentication required?	Yes	No
Can set new HSM label	Yes	Yes
Creates new SO identity	No	Yes
Creates new Domain	No	Yes
Destroys partitions	Yes	No (none exist to destroy) *
Destroys SO objects	Yes	No (none exist to destroy) *

* hsm factoryReset was performed, and destroyed partitions and objects, before the hard init... otherwise, it could not be a hard init.